This article presents the results of a hedonic property value analysis for multiple hydropower sites along the Kennebec River in Maine, including the former site of the Edwards Dam in Augusta, Maine. The effect of the removal of the Edwards Dam on the Kennebec River in Maine is examined through consumer's marginal willingness to pay to be close to or distant from the dam site. Data from both before and after the dam was removed are used to estimate changes in marginal prices. A similar data set is also used to look at the effects of the remaining upstream dams on property values.This article presents one of the first (to our knowledge) ex post analyses on the economic impact of dam removal on property values. As more privately owned dams in the United States come up for relicensing, evaluating the impacts with and without the dam will become increasingly important. This work can help inform those analyses.
This paper uses hedonic analysis to examine the impact of small dam removal on property values in south-central Wisconsin. Data on residential property sales wereobtained for three categories of sites: those where a small dam remains intact, thosewhere a small dam was removed, and those where a river or stream has been free flowing for at least 20 yr. The primary conclusions that emerge from the data arethat shoreline frontage along small impoundments confers no increase in residentialproperty value compared to frontage along free-flowing streams and that nonfrontage residential property located in the vicinity of a free-flowing stream is more valuablethan similar nonfrontage property in the vicinity of a small impoundment.
Theories of agency behavior are tested via the empirical application of hydropower project relicensing by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In the relicensing of each project, fish and wildlife afencies make formal recommendations to FERC on fish and wildlife protection at the project. FERC then enters a two-stage deliberation process during which it accepts; amends then accepts; or rejects each recommendation. We apply a count data model to explain the number of recommendations made per project and a bivariate probit model to explain FERC's disposition of the recommendations. The analysis covers 933 fish and wildlife recommendations made for 72 projects relicensed during 1980-96. Independent variables for the benefits and costs of the recommendations cannot be constructed because of FERC's deficient generation of economic information.
A background section thus details the more serious limitations of FERC's application of economic analysis. In explaining outcomes, a tension exists between the hierarchical control of Congress or the executive branch (the Progressive Reform model of agency behavior) and an agency's bureaucratic resistance to change (an evolutionary model of agency behavior). Key findings indicate that a new law (the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986) substantially altered FERC's fish and wildlife decisions, while a new administration (the Clinton administration, beginning 1993) exerted a mixed effect. Both events influenced the fish and wildlife agencies, as the number of recommendations made, per project, increased significantly at these junctures.
This report has been prepared at the request of EPA to provide an economic analysis of: 1) the costs to Tacoma of the mitigation measures I have been asked by EP to analyze (the "EPA straw man" mitigation measures), 2) how those costs would affect the total cost of Cushman Project generation and any required replacement generation, and 3) the consequences for TCL and its ratepayers of those costs. This report does not address either the environmental or economic benefits of the proposed mitigation measures, such as fishery and recreation benefits, which FERC will be obligated to consider in any Cushman licensing decision.
The proposed mitigation package would increase the cost of electricity produced at Cushman and reduce the amount of electricity generated at Cushman, without substantial rate increases and without jeopardizing Tacoma's competitive position in a deregulated market.